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FOREWORD

Interservice rivalry is a part of the modern American
military experience. It seems especially intense in periods
when technology advances during times of fiscal plenty and,
perhaps, even more intense when rapid technological
change takes place at a time of fiscal constraint. With the
Revolution in Military Affairs coinciding with declining
defense budgets, each of the armed services has presented
its vision of what its particular mission and structure
should be for the 21st century. Army After Next, Sea
Dragon, and Air Force Next all make compelling cases for
land power, sea power, and air power.
In this monograph, Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., analyzes the
Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine currently advocated by the
Air Force. As a part of his analysis, the author traces the
immediate origins of the “Halt” strategy to the aftermath of
the 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Dr.
Tilford contends, however, that Halt’s real origins are more
closely identified with intrinsic Air Force strategic bombing
doctrine, and are to be found in strategies associated with
atomic and nuclear deterrence and warfighting. Thus, he
concludes that Halt is really “new wine in old skins” being
presented today more aggressively because of rapid
technological advances.
Many will disagree with Dr. Tilford’s conclusions, and
air power enthusiasts are sure to take exception with him.
But the tension generated by opposing points of view is part
of how we advance through open and honest debate. In that
spirit, I commend to you Halt Phase Strategy: New Wine in
Old Skins. . . With Powerpoint.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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HALT PHASE STRATEGY:
NEW WINE IN OLD SKINS. . .
WITH POWERPOINT

It’s worth noting that decisions we make about our military
forces today will affect their ability to respond to crisis 20 years
from now, when there may be a danger of catastrophic failure.1
Charles G. Boyd, Jr.
General, USAF (Retired)
October 31, 1997

Introduction.
The defense intellectual community is currently
engaged in a heated debate over alternative future
strategies. The outcome of this debate may well shape the
kind of forces with which the United States will maintain its
security well beyond the first quarter of the 21st century.
The debate has engaged a broad spectrum of the community
and, despite being sometimes advanced by the latest in
“Powerpoint” slide briefing techniques, really revolves
around old issues surrounding the role of air power and is
fostered by the even older motivation of a scramble for
limited budget resources. At the center of the debate is a
concept called the “Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine,” or more
simply, “Halt.”
Proponents of Halt advocate using joint air power as the
primary or supported force in the first few days of a conflict.
This strategy would be especially critical in a second major
theater of war (MTW) when American ground forces are
already heavily committed to a first theater. It would also be
viable as a response to the primary aggression if the
aggressor attacked with mechanized forces across open
terrain. Halt proponents claim that air power can stop
enemy forces short of their objective in about 2 weeks. Once
the enemy force has been stopped, the theater commander-
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in-chief (CINC) can use air power to dominate the
battlefield or, if appropriate, attack critical targets in the
enemy’s rear or homeland, while bringing additional forces
into the theater for “countering action” (formerly known as
the counteroffensive). If needed at all, a counterattack by
land and air forces would be a kind of mopping up operation
since the issue would have been decided in the Halt Phase.
Halt proponents maintain that this strategy offers a more
effective and efficient way of warfighting, one that will save
not only American lives but also resources.2 Since the Halt
Strategy calls for a significant reduction in the size of the
Active Component of the U.S. Army, it has caused a great
deal of consternation and internal discussion within the
defense community. Although Halt’s primary proponents
couch their rhetoric in terms of “joint airpower,” this is a
service parochial, Air Force initiative.
First indications that the Air Force was becoming wary
of the possible outcome of the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) surfaced in a March 1997 article in Armed Forces
Journal entitled, “Assessing Airpower’s Importance: Will
the QDR Debate Falter for Lack of Proper Analytical
Tools?”. The author, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Steve
McNamara, claimed that the capabilities of air power so
dramatically witnessed in the Gulf War had not been
properly recognized. According to the author, the problem is
that “The current generation of mathematical models does
not capture the asymmetric contributions of airpower.”3
Specifically, TACWAR, the standard campaign model used
by the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff, failed to
fully demonstrate the potential contributions of air power.4
Then in May, the Report of the Quadrennial Defense
Review was released, and the Air Force was not pleased with
its recommendations. It suffered 26,900 personnel cuts as
against 15,000 for the Army and 18,000 for the Navy. Worse,
favored weapons programs were hit hard. The F-22 fighter
program was reduced from 438 to 339 aircraft; the B-2
bomber program was capped at 21 aircraft, and the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
2

surveillance aircraft procurement program was reduced
from 19 to 13 aircraft.5
The Debate Emerges.
On June 26, 1997, the Honorable Sheila E. Widnall, then
Secretary of the Air Force, hosted a Washington breakfast
to discuss the Air Force’s perspective on the recently
released report. During this breakfast meeting, Air Force
Major General Charles D. Link, who before his retirement
in the autumn of 1997 was Special Assistant to the Chief of
Staff for the National Defense Review, unveiled the Halt
Phase Strategy/Doctrine. This Halt doctrine serves as the
catalyst for the current debate.6
In the autumn the controversy intensified when, on
October 29, 1997, the prestigious Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) presented a “Clashes of Vision
Symposium” with the specific title, “Responding to
Aggression: Boots on the Ground vs. Technology.” Major
General Link again presented the Halt Phase Strategy, but
this time as a part of a panel which included retired Marine
Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper and Army War
College Commandant, Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.7
In June 1998, CSIS sponsored a follow-up symposium
entitled, “Dueling Doctrines and the New American Way of
War.” In part, the stated purpose of this second symposium
was as “a reprise of last October’s ‘Boots on the Ground vs.
Technology’ ” conference.8
The two CSIS conferences are part of the Air Force
response to the recommendations of the QDR and National
Defense Panel (NDP), which contrasted sharply with Air
Force experience. In the 51 years of its existence as a
separate service, the Air Force had dominated the other
services in the scramble for budget dollars. It did so by
focusing on technology as the key to fighting war both more
effectively and with less expenditure in human lives.

3

Today, as in the past, technology-inspired buzzwords,
like “precision strike” and “information dominance,”
provide the rhetoric for the debate. In the 1950s the
buzzwords were “atomic superiority” and “nuclear
deterrence.” Furthermore, the Air Force, more than any
other service, traditionally has focused on the potential of
its form of warfare to be “decisive.”
Despite the previously successful rhetoric, the reality is
that air power has yet to be the single decisive instrument in
any war. Nevertheless, to the uninitiated, the idea that air
power can deliver victory quickly and at a lower price in
human and economic resources is a seductive one. But
historically, the record indicates that a misplaced emphasis
on air forces costs lives. In 1950 it meant that an Army of ten
under-manned divisions was ill prepared for war in Korea.
In the early 1960s the Army that went into Vietnam did so
with equipment and doctrines only marginally improved
from those of World War II.9 Today the Army is smaller than
it was in 1950 and some contend that it is approaching a
state of fragility.
Halt: What’s New? What Can it Do?
The New Wine.
Halt, in its current iteration, is based upon a claim that,
with air and space-based sensors, anything on a battlefield
can be located and then destroyed with precision guided
munitions. This assertion is buttressed by a peculiar
interpretation of the Battle of Khafji during the Persian
Gulf War and by DELIBERATE FORCE, a 3-week air
campaign in the fall of 1995 that some air power advocates
claim played a decisive role in Bosnia. If the arguments
presented are valid, then indeed the United States is ready
to embark on a new national defense strategy built around
air power.
According to Halt advocates, our current strategy is
based on the outdated Cold War relationships between
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manpower and firepower whereby air power and artillery
support ground operations. But advances in technology now
make it possible to move away from the old way of fighting
wars. Halt advocates further claim that the U.S. Army,
while only the eighth largest in the world, bases its war
plans on fighting “manpower-intensive” battles with other
large armies around the world.
Furthermore, U.S. defense strategy is currently based
on conducting two different major theater wars taking place
at almost the same time in separate locations. For each war,
but most especially for the second theater, the current
strategy would be to halt the invasion and then build up
U.S. combat power while air power continues to attack
enemy forces. When sufficient land forces arrive, a counteroffensive by land and air forces would decisively defeat the
enemy. While air power plays a key role up front in blunting
and even stopping the enemy offensive, ground forces,
supported by air forces, deliver the decisive blow in the
counter-offensive phase.
The Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine, by contrast, focuses
on using air power as the primary force early in a conflict.
With superior knowledge and deadly precision, air power,
according to Halt advocates, can reduce an attacking enemy
force to the point that its offensive is stopped, and it is
unable to conduct coherent, cohesive operations. Air power
causes the enemy force to culminate early in the action, long
before significant ground forces arrive to engage the
enemy.10
With enemy forces checked, if not in disarray, halt
proponents argue, the theater CINC then has a variety of
options. One is that the bulk of the air assets can then be
used to disable the enemy regime by attacking the defense
infrastructure to include headquarters, supply depots, and
manufacturing facilities. Or the CINC can use air power to
shut off electricity, cripple internal transportation systems,
and otherwise hit targets that would disrupt the enemy’s
war-making ability.11
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A second option offered by Halt advocates would be to
build up ground forces in preparation for the decisive
counteroffensive. In the second theater, with most of the
active duty forces already engaged in the first theater,
Reserve Component (RC) forces would be used. Once they
arrive in theater, a major air-land counteroffensive would
be launched.
A third option would be to impose diplomatic and
economic sanctions while air power pounds the remnants of
an enemy army. In reality, some combination of all three of
these options might be used, depending on the situation. In
any event, even if a ground campaign is necessary, the
number of ground forces needed would be smaller than the
number required had air power not already significantly
degraded enemy capabilities.
Optimally, Halt would work best when the enemy force
operates in open terrain and relies on massed mechanized
or armored forces. Currently, this capability best addresses
three potential enemies: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. This
strategy offers the greatest chance of success against an
enemy that primarily uses Cold War legacy weapons
systems and does so without significant land-based antiaircraft assets or a robust air force of its own. With the Halt
Phase Strategy/Doctrine as the foundation for the national
security strategy of the United States, we would be best
prepared for war with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
Ostensibly, that is what Halt is supposed to accomplish.
Halt, which is not a new concept, has its roots in both history
and technology. Halt is, indeed, touted as a new operational
concept by those who are pushing to make it the centerpiece
of the National Military Strategy in the 21st Century. But,
is it really just “new wine in old skins”? Link, in his
presentation to CSIS in October, stated that air forces can
successfully implement the Halt strategy now, and could
certainly do so in the future. “The forces we have today and
are going to have in 2006, can actually constrain or deny
land forces freedom of action.”12
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As indicated earlier, the immediate roots of Halt are
based on how the Air Force interprets two recent operations:
the Battle of Khafji during the Persian Gulf War and
DELIBERATE FORCE. Looking first at the Battle of
Khafji, the Air Force’s chief historian, Dr. Richard P.
Hallion, claimed in his book, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power
and the Gulf War, that the war marked the ascendancy of
air power in warfare. Certainly air power played an
absolutely critical role in the outcome of the war, and even a
dominant role in preparing the battlefield during a 39-day
air attack on mostly stationary Iraqi forces. Still, when the
ground offensive began, the Iraqi Army remained a
formidable force of 1,772 tanks, 900 armored personnel
carriers, and 1,474 artillery pieces according to the Gulf
War Report.13
Hallion claimed also that the Battle of Khafji “was not a
totally clearcut case of a victory through air power, but it
came very close—close enough for the point to be argued
with vigor.”14 Six years later, the Battle of Khafji has
emerged as an “epic." What Hallion 6 years ago depicted as
an attack by three brigades of Iraqi armor, Dr. Rebecca
Grant in a February 1998 article in Air Force Magazine
dubbed as an attack by “Forces from Iraq’s 5th Mechanized
Division and 3d Armored Division . . .”15 Without actually
saying so, Grant’s article intimates that air power halted a
multi-division attack. But the facts present a different
picture. The attack involved only three brigades spread out
over a 60-mile front. The Iraqi armored units had little
indigenous air defense such as surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) or anti-aircraft guns, and, of course, the Iraqi Air
Force had long since been taken out of the picture.
Eventually, the Iraqi Army moved 15 kilometers and
occupied the undefended village of Khafji with one armored
brigade of 2,000 men and 50 tanks. Once in the town, the
Iraqis had to be ejected by land forces.
Undoubtedly air power played an important role. The
destruction of large portions of the three attacking brigades
had a great deal to do with Iraq abandoning plans to commit
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the remainder of its forces from the Iraqi 5th Mechanized
and 3d Armored Divisions. Allied air power, along with
Coalition artillery, to include use of the Multiple Launch
Rocket System, and JSTARS, wreaked havoc on the
committed units. But one must keep in mind that the
attacking force was stripped of any air cover and very poorly
equipped in air defense capabilities.16
It is also important to remember that U.S. Army,
Marine, and allied ground forces fixed the Iraqi forces, thus
allowing air power to pound them effectively. In the final
analysis, it took a ground offensive to eject the Iraqis from
Khafji. The recent Air Force interpretation is, to say the
least, self-serving.
Air power advocates also point to the short NATO
bombing campaign of September 1995, DELIBERATE
FORCE, that supposedly brought the Bosnian Serbs to the
negotiating table at Dayton. Bringing the Serbs to the
negotiating table was the function of a number of factors
and not solely the result of air power. At the tactical level,
the bombing undoubtedly had an effect. That said, the
aircraft were constrained by bad weather on a number of
occasions, and by the end of DELIBERATE FORCE were
running out of viable targets.17 Moreover, those who claim
that air power was the decisive factor in compelling the
negotiations overlook the contribution of the artillery of the
British and French Rapid Reaction Force which fired over
900 rounds in the early hours of the offensive alone. Their
support most certainly was not constrained by bad
weather.18
What air power advocates also overlook is the role the
Croatian Army played in bringing the Bosnian war to a
culmination point. In May 1995, the Croatian Army, in a
campaign that lasted only a few days, recaptured Western
Slavonia from ethnic Serbs. Three months later, in August,
the Croatian Army overran the entire Serb-held Krajina
region in less than 10 days. By October 1995, the combined
Croatian and Bosnian-Croat Federation armies had
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recaptured large portions of territory in Bosnia that ethnic
Serbs had seized since 1992. Indeed, by late October, the
ethnic Serbs were reeling, and Bosnian-Croat Federation
forces were advancing on key Serb strongholds, such as
Banja Luka. In short, the Bosnian Serbs knew they were on
the brink of a massive strategic defeat by land forces and
sought to end the conflict before they lost the war.
Air power’s role in the Battle of Khafji and its supposed
decisiveness in DELIBERATE FORCE constitute the
primary historical foundations for Halt. Underwriting both
of these data points of reference are capabilities that issue
from technology and those capabilities are fundamental to
the efficacy of Halt. Air Force Major General Charles Wald
claims that, “technology has matured to allow us to pursue
an ‘assured detection and destruction’ philosophy.” He
maintains that “except for deep hard buried targets, Pk is
near 100-percent and, except for moving targets, the Pf2t2
(probability of finding, fixing, targeting and tracking) is
near 100-percent.”19
While that sounds impressive, what it means is that if
the target is in the open and not moving, we can find it and
hit it. A frontiersman circa 1800 armed with a Kentucky
Long Rifle might find hitting a stationary target in the open
something rather less than remarkable. Nevertheless,
being able to find, fix, track, target and engage with
precision is fundamental to the viability of Halt. Although
since the 1950s the Air Force has been able to find and
destroy fixed targets—even deep ones—what is new is the
precision with which they can do so. The capability to hit the
target with great precision, like atomic and nuclear
weapons a half-century ago, allows air power enthusiasts to
claim—once again—that technology has at last caught up
with doctrine. In this, claims made by Halt advocates are
not all that different from those made by Air Force air power
advocates of the 1950s, if one substitutes “precision” for
“atomic."
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Old Skins: The Atomic Halt.
Advocates have quite often overstated both the potential
and the capabilities of air power. Before the United States
entered World War II, Claire Chennault, in a letter to
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, claimed that with only 150
modern fighters, 30 medium and 12 heavy bombers,
sustained at that force level, he could “accomplish the
downfall of Japan . . . probably within six months, one year
at the outside.”20 Then, on August 7, 1945, after the first
atomic bomb dropped in anger exploded over Hiroshima,
Army Air Forces Major General Curtis E. LeMay,
Commander of XX Air Force, stated, “Our present Army is
not necessary for the further prosecution of the war in the
Pacific . . . the future of land armies has been decidedly
curtailed.”21
Between 1945 and 1950, the United States disarmed
rapidly. The Air Force won its independence in 1947 based
in large part on its potential to be decisive in war. It was the
wedding of the atomic bomb to a reliable delivery vehicle, in
those days the B-29, that made this claim plausible.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the United States had a
virtual atomic monopoly in 1950, it found itself at war with
North Korea and China. The U.S. Army paid a high price for
the unfulfilled promises of air power before—and during—
the Korean War.
During the Korean War, however, the defense budget
blossomed, and the Army went from 10 under-strength to 20
full divisions. But with the Eisenhower administration, the
emphasis returned to economy in defense, and the wisdom
was that nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence provided
the most efficient approach to defense strategy. From 1954
to 1961, the annual defense budget averaged around $38
billion, and even dipped to $32 billion in real terms by 1959.
The allocations were steady during those years, with the Air
Force receiving 47 percent, the Navy and Marine Corps 29
percent, and the Army 24 percent.22
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During this time, the Air Force position held that if the
nation had a strong nuclear deterrent, then conventional or
“lesser” wars which required large conventional ground,
naval and air forces, also would be deterred. Under this
concept, the Strategic Air Command could deter local and
conventional wars. General LeMay, who became Air Force
vice chief of staff in 1958, explained it this way to the Senate
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
I do not believe we can afford to maintain separate weapon
systems for various types of arguments that we might get into
with our neighbors in the world. I think we are going to have to
build for the worst cases, and then use them for all others.23

With atomic and nuclear technologies of the 1950s,
claims that “a new era of warfare” had dawned were as
prevalent then as they are today. Colonel Robert C.
Richardson III, in a series of articles in 1954 and 1955 in the
Air University Quarterly Review, claimed, “The old concept
of a three-phase war—the holding, build-up, and
exploitation phase—is dead.”24 He went on, “The war and
the decisive phase will hereafter begin at the same time.
The next, and last, phase concerns the consolidation of the
victors’ conquests in accordance with his objectives; it may
or may not require military forces.”(emphasis added)25
Richardson, like Halt advocates nearly a half-century
later, lamented the resistance to acceptance of this new way
of warfare among the other services.
We still do not accept the formidable evidence that the initial
phase will in all likelihood be decisive. We are still diverting a
great deal of effort to the build-up and maintenance of forces
which may never enter the fight until after the basic decision
has been reached. It may be too soon to assume that the
conflict will be completely ended as a result of the atomic
exchange. But it does seem clear that whatever form war may
take in the subsequent stages, it will not be that of the classical
war of attrition.26
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Forty-four years later, Air Force Magazine Editor-inChief John T. Correll sounded a strikingly similar note
when he wrote in a October 1997 editorial, “In the Joint
world, the Air Force encounters the headwinds of tradition.
The belief is still widespread that ‘boots on the ground’ are
more important than precision attack.”27 While Mr. Correll
and many in the Air Force hold this opinion, the Army
readily acknowledges the importance of joint air power.
And, in the 1950s, as today, the speed with which air
forces could arrive on the scene was part of what made the
air power claims feasible as well as operationally attractive.
In the Summer 1954 edition of the Air University Quarterly
Review, Air Force Brigadier General James Ferguson
claimed that air power could be on the scene in a matter of
days, if not hours, to counter any land attack. Furthermore,
he pointed to the introduction of “new weapons . . . which in
themselves produce decisive results.” He claimed that
“balanced forces are no longer commensurate with the
military problem at hand . . . emphasis is not being placed on
the arm that can get there first with the most decisive
weapons.”28
In the current debate, the Air Expeditionary Force
(AEF) is the vehicle whereby air power can counter
aggression across the conflict spectrum.29 This force has
integrated capabilities to include the employment of space
information systems, manned and unmanned reconnaissance, air superiority, deep attack, and close air support. A
full array of systems comprises what one of Halt’s advocates
calls, “a extremely powerful and cost effective fighting force.”
These include AWACS, JSTARS, U-2Rs, F-117s, B-52s,
B-1s, B-2s, F-16s, F-15s, and various support aircraft like
EC-130s and KC-10s. The AEF of “Air Force Next” is going
to be “leaner, more powerful, stealthy, space- based, mobile,
and cost effective.” It will include F-22s, Joint Strike
Fighters, B-2s, F-117s, JSTARS, and even more
sophisticated space sensors and unmanned reconnaissance
vehicles.30
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Like the modern Halt strategy itself, the AEF has its
roots in the 1950s. In September 1956, the Air Force
deployed Mobile Baker, a Composite Air Strike Force
(CASF), to Europe. The leading edge of the force, a flight of
F-100s, arrived in Europe in just 4 hours and 55 minutes.
The entire force moved from bases in the United States to
Europe in a 24-hour period. Like the modern AEF, the
CASF included a number of different kinds of aircraft; B-66
tactical bombers, F-84Fs, and RF-84s, in addition to the
F-100Cs. Furthermore, all the fighter-bombers and tactical
bombers were capable of employing the 1950s technological
equivalent of precision strike: atomic and nuclear
weapons.31
With the roots of Halt and the modern-day AEF evident
in the atomic era and the Air Force’s Combined Air Strike
Force concept from the 1950s, the Halt Phase Strategy/
Doctrine may, indeed be “new wine in old skins.” But this
does not mean Halt is neither viable nor relevant. Indeed,
one can argue (as air power advocates do) that concepts of
land warfare date themselves by thousands of years. But
the questions should be, what is the current and future
relevance of the idea, concept, strategy, or doctrine? And, to
what extent should we structure our future national
security upon Halt?
Halt: Can It Work?
The Halt strategy is an appealing one, at least appealing
in the same way that Claire Chennault’s proposition must
have been to President Roosevelt. It promises quick victory
at low cost in American lives. While Halt’s proponents
admit that warfare will continue to be bloody in the 21st
century, they maintain that the Halt strategy is part of “our
responsibility to seek the least bloody solution to national
security problems.”32 But will it work? Perhaps, if all our
enemies confront us with large mechanized forces in open
terrain, and if those forces would be obliging enough to mass
in a relatively confined geographical area of a few hundred
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square miles, and if the enemy did not strike at our air bases
with their special operations forces, missiles, aircraft, or
weapons of mass destruction, if that enemy’s organic air
defenses are either scarce or degradable, and if that enemy
has no air force of its own, Halt will probably work. But just
because the last enemy we fought was so obliging is no
indication that the next one will be. In fact, there is no
reason to believe that Iraq would be inclined to repeat the
mistakes of the 1990-91 campaign in Kuwait.
Then there is North Korea. Air power would play a
critical role in helping slow any advance by the North
Korean People’s Army into the Republic of Korea. Such an
attack, should Pyongyang undertake it, would result in
great destruction for both Koreas and an enormous loss of
life. The proximity of Seoul to the border makes the
likelihood of high civilian casualties and great destruction a
virtual certainty. How likely is it that a Halt-type response
would succeed in stopping North Korean forces before they
either capture Seoul or the city is destroyed? While North
Korean armored units might suffer great losses, air power
would be of only limited utility against North Korean
special operations forces and artillery and rockets hidden in
caves.
On the other hand, the Republic of Korea’s Army is
larger than the Active Component of the U.S. Army. It is
well-trained, well-armed, and quite capable. The U.S. Army
maintains an infantry division with two brigades in South
Korea. The Air Force has three squadrons of F-16s, a
squadron of A/0A-10s, and a Special Operations squadron in
South Korea. Two additional F-16 squadrons and three F-15
squadrons are based in Japan, along with a Marine
Expeditionary Force of 15,000.33 While a conflict on the
Korean Peninsula would be costly, the United States and
the Republic of Korea will almost certainly prevail. But it
would be a bloody coalition fight, not an air campaign.
Moreover, we have to ask whether it makes good sense to
focus our entire future defense structure, one that will have
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to be the basis of our national security in 2025, on two
possibilities that are essentially remnants of the Cold War:
a rerun of the Persian Gulf War and a war on the Korean
Peninsula. Stopping mechanized forces in relatively open
terrain is an important capability, to be sure, but such a
capability covers only a narrow band of the threat spectrum
today. In the future that band is likely to be even narrower.
At the broader strategic level, can a force designed to
optimize an air Halt campaign conduct the shaping
activities called for in our National Security Strategy? Can
it do peacetime engagement or perform the myriad of peace
operations? Will our allies and potential coalition partners
be reassured by an American military that is ready to
commit aircraft and weapons, but is reluctant to commit
American soldiers to their defense? Can Halt-structured
forces respond to those crises where bombing is inappropriate such as urban combat? (Mogadishu and Haiti leap
immediately to mind.) Other than flying in supplies and
performing reconnaissance, how does air power figure into
humanitarian assistance and providing support to civil
authorities? The national security challenges of the 21st
century are far broader than Halt advocates seem to realize
and, while it is important to examine Halt in light of the
larger strategic context, what are the essential elements of
Halt and how would they work?
The Halt strategy/doctrine has six principal elements:34

•

Air power can now dominate land forces;

•

Air forces can arrive on the scene rapidly;

•

Air power can force the enemy to culminate in days;

•

Air power can win a decisive victory in a few weeks;

•

Reliance on air power is morally right and economically efficient;
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•

We have the technology necessary to find virtually all
significant targets and to destroy them quickly and
efficiently.

If air power could do all these things across the broad
spectrum of current and anticipated national security
threats, Halt might be the right foundation upon which to
base a military strategy for the 21st century.35 It is not that
air power advocates once more have promised more than
they could possibly deliver, because within certain narrow
parameters, Halt might work. Rather, it is that they have
devised an approach to a form of future warfare that is
becoming less likely as time goes on.
Assessing the Elements of Halt.
Will Halt work and, if so, under what circumstances? As
a way of assessing the efficacy of Halt we will examine the
six elements of Halt identified above.

•

Air power can now dominate land forces.

Under certain circumstances air power can, indeed,
dominate land forces. Certainly air power played a vital,
even dominant role, in the now much-celebrated Battle of
Khafji. Any enemy which masses in open terrain, without
organic air defenses such as SAMs and without an air force
to cover it, would be vulnerable to attack by air forces like
those of the United States and, for that matter, a number of
other nations.
The environment and the terrain have a great deal to do
with whether or not air power can be effective. Historically,
air forces have not dealt well with forces moving at night, in
mountainous terrain, in bad weather or under the cover of
foliage. The jungles and forests of Indochina presented their
very special problems. In the 3 years and 9 months of
Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the American bombing of
North Vietnam from March 1965 through October 1968, air
power not only failed to stem the flow of troops and supplies
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moving south, but the infiltration increased dramatically
each year. The second Jason Study, completed by the
Institute for Defense Analyses in December 1967, found
that, “We are unable to devise a bombing campaign in the
North to reduce the flow of infiltrating personnel into South
Vietnam.”36
Operation COMMANDO HUNT, a series of seven air
interdiction campaigns conducted along the Ho Chi Minh
Trail from November 1968 to April 1972, likewise failed,
despite the dropping of nearly 2.5 million tons of bombs.
While AC-130 gunships blasted trucks motoring down the
Trail at night, and B-52s and fighter-bombers bombed truck
parks, storage areas, and the route structure during the
day, the North Vietnamese succeeded in moving enough
supplies and troops into South Vietnam to change the
complexion of the war. Prior to 1968 the war had been
mostly a guerrilla war, albeit one with increasingly conventional aspects. After 1969, despite all the ordnance and
napalm dropped, the war became predominantly
conventional. By 1972, with 14 divisions of the People’s
Army of Vietnam (PAVN) pouring into South Vietnam, 11 of
them attacking from Laos and Cambodia, it is hard to see
how the bombing of the Trail had been anything but an
operational failure.
Pointing to advances in technology, Halt advocates
would respond, “that was then and this is now.” But the uses
and misuses of air power in Vietnam show quite clearly that
putting bombs on target at the tactical level, and even
succeeding at the operational level, does not translate into
strategic victory. Even our most successful employment of
air power during the Vietnam War, LINEBACKERS I and
II, the bombing campaigns of 1972, failed to secure a
strategic victory, something air power enthusiasts do not
seem to understand.37
Prior to Operation DESERT STORM, LINEBACKER I,
the air power response to North Vietnam’s massive invasion
of South Vietnam in the Spring of 1972, stood as the most
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dramatic evidence that air forces can, indeed, play a pivotal
role in halting an enemy ground offensive. In fact,
LINEBACKER I was the first modern air campaign in
which precision guided munitions played a key part in the
strategy. Air power did play a vital role in stopping the
PAVN advance. But ground forces were also important. For
one thing, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, which bore
the brunt of the attack, fought better than it ever had before,
forcing the PAVN to mass their forces, thus providing
targets for aerial attack. The PAVN also made some
fundamental mistakes. They laid siege to ARVN units holed
up in fire support bases rather than simply maneuvering
around them and continuing on to other objectives. Also,
when the PAVN laid siege to major towns like Kontum and
An Loc, they provided large, stationary targets.38
In 1975, the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF), by
then the world’s seventh or eighth largest air force, was
totally ineffective despite having complete air supremacy
over the battlefield.39 Air power failed for a number of
reasons. First, the PAVN engaged in much more constant
and dispersed maneuver. Because the ARVN’s disintegration was near total, it was not necessary for the North
Vietnamese to mass their forces except on those occasions
when the South Vietnamese stood and fought, as some units
did at Xuan Loc, just north of Saigon. Second, the RVNAF,
despite its formidable size, in addition to being gutted by
lack of parts and maintenance, was also a lightweight,
consisting primarily of A-37s and F-5As, trainers converted
into fighter-bombers, Korean War vintage A-1 propellerdriven fighter-bombers, and helicopters. The PAVN
brought plenty of air defense capability with them, to
include shoulder-fired SA-7 missiles, 23mm and radardirected 57mm anti-aircraft guns, and SA-2 surface-to-air
missiles. These quickly neutralized what remained of the
RVNAF. Certainly, American air power might well have
been withering in its effect, if using it to do more than cover
the final evacuation had been an option. At the very least, if
American air power had been available to pound the
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attacking PAVN divisions, it would have forced them to
fight differently. While the PAVN victory would have taken
longer, with the ARVN collapse no amount of bombing,
except possibly an annihilative strategic bombing campaign
against North Vietnam, could have saved the Saigon
government.
While the historical evidence that air power alone can
dominate the battlefield is not compelling, ground forces
have, in fact, won wars in which the opposing side had
complete air supremacy over the battlefield. The communist
victories in two Indochina Wars, the stalemate in the
Korean War, and Mujahadeen victory in Afghanistan
simply cannot be ignored.

•

Air power can arrive on the scene quickly.

Speed and range, while not commingled attributes, are
significant elements of air power. Bombers flying from
forward operating locations can reach many targets within
a few hours. If American planes are already based nearby,
they can be airborne in minutes, depending on the amount
of warning, and enroute to their targets. Certainly, aircraft
carriers can put several squadrons of fighter-bombers
within quick striking distance of almost any littoral target
on earth. As one Halt proponent claims, “450 knot deployers
that can create serious military effect while exposing only
limited vulnerability to the enemy early on.”40
In reality, the speed with which air power can deploy to a
given point on the globe depends on a number of factors.
First, what kind of warning will we have? The initial Iraqi
attack into Kuwait involved an armored and mechanized
division and helicopter-borne special forces troops. In about
6 hours they had captured Kuwait City.41 Had long-range
bombers been ready and armed, had the targets been
selected, the crews briefed, and the political decisions to
employ force been made, at 450 knots CONUS-based
bombers would have been somewhere over the Atlantic
when the Iraqis secured their initial objectives. By the time
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the bombers would have arrived, the Iraqis would have
already occupied Kuwait City.
If bases are available in the theater, then air power can
respond more quickly. Or, if aircraft carriers are on station
nearby, their planes offer a valuable option, provided the
political decision to use force has been made, the targets
have been selected, and the crews and their machines have
been prepared. These are, of course, best case scenarios.
Bases quite often are not available. In the early 1998 crisis
over Iraqi intransigence concerning U.N. inspection of sites
where weapons of mass destruction might be produced and
stored, it was unclear which bases in what countries would
be available, if any. Also, we cannot always count on overflight permission.
The interests of the United States simply are not always
congruent with those of other nations, not even with those of
our friends and allies. In Operation ELDORADO CANYON,
the April 15, 1986, U.S. raid on Libya in retaliation for a
terrorist attack on a Berlin night club frequented by
American soldiers, over-flight rights and permission to
stage attacks from bases in friendly and allied countries
generally were not forthcoming. Consequently, the
attacking F-111s, flying from Britain, had to fly a circuitous
over-water route that both lengthened and complicated the
mission.
Some nations, particularly in the Persian Gulf, have
cultural, religious, and political concerns about hosting
large numbers of American service personnel. Their ruling
elites seem to fear that an American presence may be
politically destabilizing. Then there is the possibility that
the presence of U.S. forces may make them a target of direct
attack, whether in the form of preemptive raids, to include
the possible use of chemical and biological weapons, or in
the form of terrorist attacks of various kinds. In short, the
claim that air power can arrive on the scene quickly must be
qualified in several respects.
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Some Halt advocates will argue that forward bases are
not entirely necessary. Certainly today’s long-range bomber
force, its effectiveness enhanced by stand-off weapons and
precision guided munitions, with aerial refueling can strike
targets anywhere on the globe. That is so, but it may also
have the unintended consequence of driving a future
opponent to attack the U.S. homeland, even if only the bases
from which such aircraft operate. A future enemy does not
need a strategic bomber force or intercontinental ballistic
missiles to do that. A van, truck, or even an automobile can
carry weapons capable of crippling, if not destroying, many
critical air base facilities. Such attacks need not be carried
out by “terrorists.” Enemy SOF units, infiltrated across our
borders, conceivably could conduct such operations.

•

Air power can force the enemy to culminate in
days.

The great German philosopher of war, Carl Von
Clausewitz, linked the culminating point of the attack to
what he called “the diminishing force of the attack.” At that
culminating point, “the scale turns and the reaction
(counterattack) follows with a force that is usually much
stronger than that of the original attack.”42 At that point, it
is time to win and to do so quickly and definitively. Certainly
Clausewitz knew that the effect of force diminishes over
time. “The diminishing force of the attack is one of the
strategist’s main concerns.”43 The Halt Strategy/Doctrine
puts the culminating point early in the conflict, when air
power stops the invading enemy force. At this point time
becomes a factor. The enemy, however, may well be the one
that benefits most because its forces have time to disperse,
dig in, or withdraw to a more tenable position. Indeed,
time can be a gift for the enemy. Additionally, over time
people become used to bombardment or find ways to
ameliorate its effects.
Clausewitz also tells us that war is like a wrestling
match. Each side acts and reacts to the initiatives of the
other. There is the question of why the enemy would mass
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forces during the attack unless there was a ground
objective. Usually an enemy will mass for one of two
reasons. First, to bring as much force to bear upon the
defensive force at what the enemy commander considers to
be its most vulnerable point. Second, armies mass to seize
and hold an objective. In most cases, since fortresses do not
play the role they once did, this will be an urban area or an
important economic asset, like an oil field or port.
But, for the sake of addressing Halt as a strawman, let us
assume that the enemy masses his forces and moves into
friendly territory. What would make the enemy force stop?
When the attacking force loses the ability to maneuver it
will stop. So many tanks, fighting vehicles, armored
personnel carriers, and trucks, spotted by space-based
systems and by JSTARS, may be destroyed that the enemy
has to give up the attack. Undoubtedly, air power will be
attacking the lines of communications, and surviving
vehicles may lack fuel. (All this assumes that the enemy
attacks with a mechanized force proceeding without organic
air defenses such as mobile SAMs and anti-aircraft guns,
and that the enemy air force has been defeated or is not a
factor.)
If an attack is carried out by mechanized forces, it is
possible to destroy enough vehicles to cause the enemy to do
one of three things: give up, disperse, or dig in. In the first
case, the leaders of the attacking nation decide that further
operations are either impossible or too costly and stop their
aggression. In the second case, which seems most likely,
they decide that massing their forces invites attack.
Depending on the terrain, maneuver may still be possible,
even if numbers of vehicles have been destroyed or
otherwise incapacitated. Certainly infantry can take this
approach and continue the attack.
Or the enemy force may dig in and attempt to fight a
battle of attrition against the attacking air forces, as the
Egyptian Army did in October 1973 when it crossed the
Suez Canal. As soon as the Egyptian Army gained a foothold
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in the Sinai, it established an interlocking air defense
system that included SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, and SA-9
surface-to-air missiles and ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns.
The vaunted Israeli Air Force admitted to losing 115
aircraft, 60 in the first week of the war.44 It is not beyond the
realm of possibility that enemy forces would have effective
SAMs, or even laser weapons, that could make aerial
attacks costly, or at least diminish their effectiveness to the
point that the offense can resume. If the enemy manages to
negate the effects of air power, and sufficient friendly
ground forces are not in place, then friendly force options
become limited, and defeat is a distinct possibility.
If the enemy chooses to disperse, hunting down and
destroying each individual tank, truck and fighting vehicle
or rifle company could be time consuming and expensive. In
his October 29, 1998, presentation at CSIS, General Link
assumes that “We can buy munitions.”45 The message of
Rebecca Grant’s Airpower and the Total Force: The Gift of
Time is that if we convert several active Army divisions to
National Guard divisions there will be enough money to
fund “big ticket items” like the F-22 and F-18E/F. Even if
there are funds available to provide enough PGMs,
destroying individual vehicles will prove very expensive.
Even if successful, it may inflict more casualties than
necessary. The objective of combat should not be butchery,
but to break the enemy’s will. Furthermore, attacking
dismounted infantry with precision guided munitions
would not only be expensive and time consuming; it also is
likely to be ineffective.
Two more issues need to be addressed. First, there is a
cultural issue revolving around technology. During the
Vietnam War, the United States, and especially the U.S. Air
Force, was ever in search of a technologically inspired
“silver bullet” that would deliver quick victory at a low cost
in lives and resources. Cluster bombs, napalm, herbicide
defoliants, electro-optical, and laser-guided bombs all
promised much. While they were often used effectively, it
also seemed to many that a cruel and unusual technology
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had been unleashed on a “peaceful and peace loving” people.
The North Vietnamese made the most of this perception and
used it to help fuel the anti-war movement in this country,
thereby weakening our resolve.
Second, what nation would be so foolish as to structure
their armed forces in such a way as to insure their
vulnerability to the kind of air attack implicit in the Halt
Strategy/Doctrine? The military forces fielded by Iraq and
North Korea are not the ones which pose the greatest threat
to us now or in the future. Our greatest threat will come
from those opponents who will exploit cultural and political
asymmetries to blunt our technological superiority.

•

Air power can win a decisive victory in a matter
of weeks.

Theoretically, under certain circumstances, air power
may be able to win a decisive victory in a matter of weeks.
That assumption is the foundation for the efficacy of
massive retaliation and deterrence. Historically, however,
air power has yet to be the decisive element in war. Only the
most ardent air power enthusiasts maintain that bombing
was decisive in World War II. Most historians would argue
that while air power played a major role in the war effort,
the ability to control sea lines of communications and,
ultimately, to control terrain was what proved decisive. A
greater number of “true believers” argue that while air
power may not have “won” the Vietnam War, it could have
been “decisive” if some combination of political leadership,
the anti-war movement, and a pernicious press had not
interfered “to tie the hands” of airmen.46
Over the years, air power enthusiasts have seemed to
confuse tactical and operational success with strategic
decisiveness. The ability to destroy targets does not
necessarily translate into strategic success. However, the
historical record is quite clear that when operations are
conducted as part of a combined arms force, air power can
play a key, even pivotal role, in the outcome. This was
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certainly the case in LINEBACKER I and in Operation
DESERT STORM. But the historical record does not
indicate that air power alone has ever been decisive in war.
Is it then wise to build a whole national security strategy on
prophecy and promises?

•

Reliance on air power is morally right and
economically efficient.

Halt proponents claim that because of the capabilities
derived from advances in technology, future warfare can
both be less bloody and more economically efficient.
Therefore, since we have these capabilities we are morally
bound to build forces and devise strategies that will enable
us to pursue not only less bloody forms of warfare, but to do
so with a defense establishment that is more affordable.47
In the IRIS Corporation’s pamphlet, Airpower and the
Total Force, Rebecca Grant argues that the Army is asking
the nation to accept the possibilities of massive casualties as
a way of retaining force structure, specifically 10 Active
Component divisions. She claims that, “Army planning also
has focused on manpower-intensive scenarios such as urban
warfare” as part of its “justifications for high levels of
manpower-intensive forces.” According to Grant, another
way in which the Army is trying to justify its “manpowerintensive” structure is to raise the possibility of an enemy
using weapons of mass destruction.48
Dr. Grant has misstated the Army’s position on urban
warfare. The Army would prefer not to fight in cities since
this form of warfare is highly destructive and potentially
quite bloody. But one of the consequences of relying on a
Halt strategy would be that in the absence of land forces to
fix the aggressor, the enemy would move rapidly into urban
areas as a way of negating the technological advantages
inherent in precision strike.
Historically, many have looked to technology for ways to
lessen the carnage of the battlefield. In the early 17th
century for instance, there was a widely held expectation
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that the introduction of gunpowder weapons, especially
artillery, would make warfare less horrible. The brutal
slamming of clubs and axes and the slicing and disemboweling by swords could be replaced with the less-personal and
supposedly more humane blasting by artillery or the
supposedly quicker death resulting from a gunshot.
Confederate and Union soldiers cut to ribbons by rifled
mu sk etry an d g rap es hot d ur i ng the Ci vi l War ,
frontkampfers and doughboys enduring artillery barrages
on the Western Front in World War I, and Legionaries being
pounded by Viet Minh artillery and Katyusha rockets at
Dien Bien Phu would find that a strange notion. In fact,
most advances in weapons technology have resulted in
greater and not lesser carnage. The modern mavens of
precision who argue that we will succeed if we kill enough of
the enemy force, whether or not their will is broken, need to
reread Clausewitz and, perhaps read one of the many
histories of the Red Army in World War II.
After the carnage of World War I, particularly along the
Western Front, the idea arose that flying to the enemy’s
heartland to destroy their industrial warmaking capacity
would bring warfare to a rapid conclusion and, thereby,
ameliorate the violence by lessening its duration. German
civilians bombed out of their houses by the Royal Air Force
and nearly a million dead Japanese civilians, burned,
blasted, and irradiated by American air power might find
the idea of humane death from above a strange notion as
well.
Finally, one way for an enemy to counter the Halt
strategy would be to move their forces into urban areas as
quickly as possible. Then the United States would be faced
with urban warfare, something to which air power and high
firepower weapons are not suited. Bombing in the cities
almost certainly would be very destructive, and the only
alternative would be to employ American ground forces,
predominantly light infantry supported by armor, in a form
of combat that is notoriously bloody and destructive.
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The historical record is that neither military technology
nor air power has lessened the human and economic costs of
war. In 1964, as the United States drifted toward involvement in Vietnam, Air Force leaders urged a strategic
bombing campaign as a way of bringing Hanoi’s leadership
to its collective knees quickly. Such a campaign was
presented as a low risk and low cost alternative to the
deployment of ground forces to South Vietnam. 49
Unfortunately, bombing did not compel North Vietnam to
desist in its aggression and before the war was over, 48,000
Americans died in combat, some 43,000 of which were
soldiers and Marines.50
Another part of this argument is that air power provides
a more efficient alternative to maintaining large, standing
armies. This, too, is not a new argument. It was advanced by
the Air Force during the 1950s and was accepted by the
Eisenhower administration. During that time, massive
retaliation with atomic and nuclear weapons was the
foundation for national security under the “New Look”
strategy. Although President Eisenhower, a retired Army
five-star general, understood the traditional efficacy of land
forces, he turned to air power as a cost-effective and more
efficient way to defend the United States against the Soviet
Union. Eisenhower believed that maintaining a large Army
and preparing for either a conventional war with the
manpower-intensive forces of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw
Pact, and China or fighting a series of limited, conventional
wars could bankrupt the United States.51 If the U.S.
economy collapsed, the thinking was that other Western
economies would be vulnerable and a general economic
disaster might then take place. Then the Communists
would win by default. Reliance on strategic nuclear forces
and the strategy of massive retaliation seemed the most
efficient way to address all those concerns.
Air Force doctrine fit well into the strategy of massive
retaliation. A generally held assumption, both in the Air
Force and the Army, was that if they could fight and win the
big war, they could fight and win smaller wars with lesser
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applications of the same kind of force. Instead of modifying
their force structures and changing their doctrines to
accommodate limited wars, the services, especially the Air
Force, tried to fit limited warfare into their approach for
fighting general wars. At the high end of the technological
spectrum, nuclear weapons would be used. John F.
Loosbrook, editor of Air Force Magazine, in 1956 wrote,
“Today’s nuclear weapons, coupled with our determination
to use them if needed, can take the profit out of aggressive
war, big or little.”52 The assumption that being able to fight
and win the big war would translate to tactical, operational,
and strategic success in a small war was put to the test in
Vietnam, and found wanting.

•

Technology makes it possible to find virtually
all significant targets and destroy them.

Does the United States have this capability? While the
list of American technological capabilities is lengthy, we do
not yet have the ability to find nearly every target on any
battlefield and destroy them. While with JSTARS and other
aerial and space-based sensors we can find many targets
and direct strikes upon them, even the most avid Halt
advocates admit that we are only now beginning to deploy
airborne and space sensors that can identify, tag, and track
moving targets. Furthermore, targets that are buried or
otherwise concealed remain beyond most of our current
capabilities.53
Certainly we are not there yet. During the Persian Gulf
War, the Air Force was unsuccessful in finding SCUD
launchers in the open spaces of the desert. More recently, all
of our highly technical space-based systems seemed unable
to tell us that India was about to engage in nuclear tests at a
nuclear test facility whose location was known. While
current systems probably can pretty well identify and tag a
massed mechanized force moving in the open, again that is a
very small part of the threat spectrum. Will our advanced
technologies work in cities and jungles? Even if they do, will
our precision guided munitions work in jungles or forests?
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Will we be able to detect and track forces that are highly
dispersed? Are we going to develop a new family of airdelivered PGMs that can take out individuals or armored
vehicles in cities without causing extensive collateral
damage? The United States must pursue these capabilities,
but in the meantime it would be foolish to base our national
security strategy on anticipated advances in technology.
Halt: A Rearward Looking Strategy.
The Halt Strategy/Doctrine is new wine in old skins.
Cynically, one might conclude that, at its most extreme,
Halt is a parochial attempt by one service to garner as much
of the available defense budget as possible. But it is not
being overly charitable to assume that many of those who
espouse the Halt strategy are sincerely committed to
pursuing what they truly believe to be in the best national
security interests of the United States. In fact, air power
will play a key role in many future operations. In some
instances it will play a larger role than in others. If during
some future conflict a preponderance of American forces are
engaged in one part of the world, and a second enemy
elsewhere mounts a mechanized attack across relatively
open terrain, air power could have a devastating impact.
That eventuality, however, constitutes a real but relatively
small part of the threat spectrum.
Not only would a National Security Strategy based on
the Halt Phase Strategy and Doctrine be operationally
narrow, it would be strategically limited in several ways.
Halt is totally reactive and therefore cedes the strategic
initiative to the adversary. It cannot accomplish or even
contribute to the vast majority of peacetime engagement
activities that can help avoid major conflict. Within its
optimum band of effectiveness, Halt can only handle a
limited target set: specifically, mechanized and armored
forces operating in open terrain. Rather than expanding the
role of air power, the impact of the Halt advocates may well
be to make air power narrower in its application. Even if
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Halt can do everything its advocates claim, it will be
irrelevant for the broader, yet still critical, segments of the
conflict spectrum.
Revolutions change everything. One of the problems
with the current revolution in military affairs (RMA) is that
we are not even sure it is a real revolution. And if it is, very
few service advocates are willing to consider the kind of
changes necessary to make the RMA truly revolutionary. To
varying extents, each service’s vision of the future is based
upon conducting DESERT STORM faster and better. Very
few are willing to consider the possibility that future
doctrines, strategies, and force structures may be
radically—not just evolutionarily—different from those of
the present. Buzzwords like “information” and “shooter”
tied to the word “centric” does not a revolution make.
Furthermore, it is dangerous to depend on technology. If
a foe with symmetric capabilities emerges in the 21st
century, they will attack our technological capabilities and
probably degrade them. Or, if they have niche capabilities,
they can use them as the North Vietnamese used SA-2s and
MiG fighters, to attack our air strategy asymmetrically.
Currently work is being done on lasers as a way of destroying the sensors needed to find targets and to guide
munitions to those targets. Low technology counters to
precision-guided munitions appeared almost as soon as the
first laser-guided bombs were used in Laos in 1969 when
smudge pots were employed to create smoke. If our national
defense is focused entirely on high technology, we invite
technological trump, spoofing, and alternative tactics.
Halt concept advocates are engaged in an exercise in
wishful thinking for the present and in magical thinking for
the future. In late June, a week after the CSIS “Dueling
Doctrines” conference, an Iraqi air defense radar locked
onto four British Tornado fighter-bombers patrolling the
Southern No-Fly Zone over Iraq. An F-16CJ fired a HARM
(high speed anti-radiation missile) at the site with
unspecified results. This event should give pause to those
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Halt proponents who minimize the threat posed by current
surface-to-air missile systems. Obviously, they could
jeopardize the viability of the Halt strategy in any
present-day operation. According to an article published in
the July 6, 1998 edition of Aviation Week and Space
Technology, by “netting” older missile systems, like the
SA-2, with French or Chinese radars, U.S. planes can be
made vulnerable. The effect of netting is that the electronic
observables of the radars that guide the SAMs are
sufficiently altered so that, at best, on-board electronic
defense systems are slow to recognize them as a threat. At
worst, they miss the threat altogether. Furthermore, the
removal of EF-111 electronic jamming aircraft and F-4G
Wild Weasels from the Air Force inventory cannot have
enhanced the Air Force’s capabilities for degrading or
destroying enemy air defenses. For the present, it would be
wishful thinking to assume that any potential enemy would
consider attacking with massed mechanized or armored
forces that were not accompanied by a robust network of
SAMs, probably modified to trump our electronic
countermeasures and anti-SAM systems. For the future,
the Air Force’s response to this threat is to further develop
stealth technology. To assume that a future enemy will not
be working on ways to obviate the advantages of low
observable technologies is to go beyond wishful—and into
magical—thinking.54
Halt also invites asymmetrical approaches, which, if our
forces are rigidly structured to address a narrow band of the
threat, may prove disproportionately effective. In the 21st
century, wars, as we know them, between nation states will
probably be infrequent. Conflict, mostly outside the norms
of current international law and rules of engagement, will
be common and will focus on internal factions within failed
states or regions.
Our most probable adversaries for the foreseeable future
are much more likely to be transnational or subnational
groups like criminal syndicates, drug cartels, and various
kinds of political or religious terrorist groups. These threats
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will emerge from the rubble of failed or failing states. Their
battlegrounds will range from the slums of megacities to the
computer networks that run the financial and governmental bureaucracies of the future. Against these threats
JSTARS, F-22s, Multiple-Launch-Rocket-Systems, and
Joint Strike Fighters will be virtually useless. Such
high-technology weapons might deter a nation from overt
aggression, but they cannot secure us from a devastating
attack by computer viruses planted in our banking system
or air traffic control system. Indeed, the Iraqi onslaught
toward Khafji in 1991, like the Persian Gulf War itself, may
well have been the sunset of a past era of warfare rather
than the dawn of new one. If so, it should not be the
foundation upon which we structure national security for
the 21st century.
Nearly 75 years ago Billy Mitchell wrote,
Of course, everything begins and ends on the ground. A person
cannot permanently live out on the sea nor can a person live up
in the air, so that any decision in war is based on what takes
place ultimately on the ground.55

Although outer space and cyberspace will assume greater
importance in modern conflict, wars of the future will
continue to be predominantly waged in the dimensions of
land, sea, and air. But because human beings engage in
economic and political intercourse on the land, the ability in
peace, crisis, and war to exert prompt and sustained
influence on or from the land will remain critical.56 In the
final analysis, it is land forces that exercise direct control
over people and resources. This will not change as a result of
increased technological capabilities.
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